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Abstract
The New Economic Geography (NEG) literature has paid little atten-
tion to the role of the banking industry in a¤ecting where rms decide to
locate their business. Within the framework of the NEG, this paper aims
to ll this gap by studying the impact of the degree of regional nancial
development on the spatial distribution of economic activity.
In order to explore this issue, we modify the standard Footloose En-
trepreneur (FE) model by introducing a banking sector, while preserving
all the other usual assumptions. We show that the existence of a bank-
ing sector enhances the agglomeration forces; so that, when regions are
symmetric, a Core-Periphery outcome is more likely. When regions are
characterised by di¤erent levels of nancial development this result is re-
inforced and entrepreneurs are more likely to migrate towards the region
where the banking sector is characterized by a higher degree of competi-
tion / lower degree of concentration and the interest rate is lower.
Keywords : Local nancial development, Banks, Agglomeration, Firm
location
JEL classication : G10, G21, R12, R51
1 Introduction
The recent events related to the nancial crisis have shown how the impact of the
global credit crunch on regional economic activities has been di¤erent according
to the specic features of local credit markets. The New Economic Geography
(NEG) framework represents a suitable tool of analysis to explore these issues;
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nevertheless, until now, the NEG literature has paid little attention to the role of
the banking industry in a¤ecting the spatial distribution of economic activity.1
This paper aims to ll this gap by analysing how the degree of regional nancial
development could a¤ect where rms decide to locate their business.
In a context where the world capital market becomes more integrated this
could seem an irrelevant issue; in fact, if a rise in the international capital mo-
bility and the homogeneity of law regulation promotes a rise in the uniformity of
credit conditions across regions, then the regional nancial development would
not a¤ect rmslocational choice. However, empirical evidence mostly supports
the opposite view: for example, Guiso et al. (2004) shows that the likelihood
of starting a new business or the number of rms per inhabitant are positively
correlated with local nancial development; where the degree of nancial devel-
opment is measured by rmsaccessibility to external funds.
Among factors determining this nding, we think that geographical distance
plays a key role, since it prevents to equalize credit conditions across regional
nancial markets. On the whole, empirical results mostly support this view
with geographical distance that adversely a¤ects credit availability for rms;
in Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) the negative inuence comes from the op-
erational distance, that is, the distance between a rm and a bank branch,
while in Alessandrini et al.(2009a, 2009b) this negative impact comes from the
functional distance, that is, the physical, economic, social, and cultural prox-
imity between a local branch, where information is collected and lending re-
lationships are established, and its headquarter, where ultimate decisions are
typically taken. Notice that geographical distance also adversely a¤ects the de-
fault rate on loans; Bofondi and Gobbi (2006) show that the expected default
rate is lower for incumbent banks with a large market share and with branches
than for entrant banks without branches. The main reason explaining these
results are information costs, that consist of the time and e¤ort spent by a po-
tential lender to assess and monitor a potential borrower; these costs increase
in the geographical distance and negatively a¤ect credit availability for rms.2
Moreover, geographical distance not only a¤ects credit decisions of banks, but
also their decisions to enter in a new market by opening a new branch; Felici
and Pagnini (2008) show that the empirical evidence is consistent with a strong
negative correlation between geographical distance and entry decisions.3 Based
on the above considerations, we can consider geographical distance as a factor
that promotes segmentation of local credit markets, through its impact on in-
formation costs; in our analysis below, we take this into account when we dene
the characteristics of regional credit markets.
This paper focuses on the relationship between di¤erent degrees of nancial
development across regions and the spatial distribution of economic activity.
In order to explore this issue, we modify the standard Footloose Entrepreneur
1See Martin (2011).
2Also Degryse and Ongena (2005) put forward a similar view, but the authors draw the
attention to the role of trasportation costs.
3Felici and Pagnini (2008) also show a declining role over time of the distance in determining
entry behaviour mainly for the advent of information and comunication technologies.
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(FE) model4 by introducing a banking sector, while preserving all the other
usual assumptions.
The banking industry is characterised as follows: rst, rms borrow from
banks their working capital due to frictions in the payment system of the econ-
omy: workers cannot buy goods before receiving wages, while rms cannot pay
wages before selling goods; so that entrepreneurs borrow nancial resources
from banks to anticipate wage payments. Within a neoclassical model of an
open economy, Neumeyer and Perri (2005) make a similar assumption to jus-
tify the working capital need of rms. Thus interest payments should also be
taken into account in the analysis. Second, banks cannot move from one re-
gion to another and cannot lend to rms located in other regions, that is, we
do not allow for inter-regional/international bank mobility and/or for inter-
regional/international nancial capital mobility. We are aware that this is a
strong simplication on the e¤ect of distance on banking activities, but it al-
lows to focus on the main aspects of the relationship between the degree of the
regional nancial development and the spatial distribution of economic activity;
moreover, the empirical evidence supports the view that geographical distance
and information costs work for the segmentation of local credit markets.5 Third,
banks operate in an oligopolistic market; particularly, we implement the stan-
dard model of oligopolistic competition among banks developed by Klein (1971)
and Monti (1972) as reported in Frexias and Rochet (1999). An important out-
come of this model is that interest rates charged on loans are negatively related
to the demand elasticity and negatively (positively) related to the degree of com-
petition (concentration) in the banking sector. Empirical evidence abundantly
supports these results;6 particularly, Corvoisier and Gropp (2002) show that the
concentration degree in credit markets is statistically di¤erent across euro area
countries and positively a¤ects interest margins of banks for short-term loans.
Notice that the latter evidence is perfectly consistent with the assumption of
segmentation of regional credit markets.
In our analysis, the degree of competition in the banking industry a¤ects
rms locational choice. When we consider the case of regions with the same
degree of nancial development and therefore with the same characteristics of
the credit market  translating into indentical interest rates on loans , a
symmetric increase in the regional interest rates strenghtens the agglomeration
forces and full agglomeration of manufacturing activities in one region could
emerge as the most likely long-run equilibrium. When the regions have di¤erent
degrees of nancial development, the manuacturing activity is attracted towards
the region that enjoys a higher degree of competion in the banking sector and
a lower interest rate. Finally our analyis also shows a hysteresis e¤ect in the
locational choice of rms: a temporary shock that increases competition in the
4See Ottaviano (1996), Forslid (1999), Forslid and Ottaviano (2002), Baldwin et al. (2003).
5For the empirical evidence, see Felici and Pagnini (2008), Agarwal and Hauswald (2010),
Alessandrini et al. (2009a; 2009b), Bofondi and Gobbi (2006).
6See Berger and Hannan (1989; 1992), Neuberger and Zimmermann (1990), Corvoisier and
Gropp (2002); for an opposite view, see Jackson (1992). For a review of the literature, see
Berger et al. (2004).
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banking industry in one region may cause migration of manufacturing rms
towards that region that is not reversed when the shock is removed.
The paper is organized as follows. Section (2) introduces the model frame-
work. Section (3) describes the characteristics of the short-run equilibrium.
Section (4) presents the fully dynamical model, while sections (5)-(6) study the
properties of the long-run equilibrium, respectively, in the symmetric and asym-
metric case with respect to the level of nancial development. Section (7) draws
some conclusions.
2 The Basic Framework
We modify the FE model by introducing a banking sector, while preserving
all the other assumptions of the standard FE model. The economy consists of
two trading regions (r = 1; 2), three sectors: Agriculture (A), Manufacturing
(M), and Banking (B); and three factors of production: unskilled workers (L),
entrepreneurs (E), and bank capital (K). E is mobile accross regions, whereas
L is inter-regionally immobile but freely mobile across sectors. Each bank owner
is endowed with one unit of bank capital, so that K represents both the overall
number of capital owners and the overall bank capital of the economy; nally,
bank owners cannot move from one region to the other and cannot lend to rms
located in the other region.
The two regions are symmetric in terms of tastes, technology, transport costs,
number of unskilled workers, but might di¤er in the number of entrepreneurs.
Concerning the degree of regional nancial development, we deal rst with the
case of equal distribution of bank capital units; and then we consider the case
of di¤erent regional degrees of nancial development.
2.1 Consumers
Consumers, that is, unskilled workers, entrepreneurs and bankers, show identical
tastes. Theyve got Cobb-Douglas preferences over a homogeneous agricultural
good and a quantity index represented by a CES utility function of the manu-
factured varieties:
U = C1 A C

M (1)
where  is the costant income share devoted to the consumption of a basket of
manufactured varieties (CM ), while 1  is that one devoted to the consumption
of the agricultural good (CA). CM corresponds to a CES function:
CM =
nX
i=1
c
 1

i
where  > 1 denes the constant elasticity of substitution between the manu-
factured varieties, the lower is , the greater the consumerstaste for variety;
ci is the consumption of one manufactured variety, while i = 1:::n denotes one
specic variety.
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2.2 The Agricultural Sector
The Agriculture sector produces a homegeneous good under perfect competition
and costant returns; specically, the production requires one unit of unskilled
labour for ech unit of output. The standard assumption of the the so-called non-
full-specialization condition holds, so that neither region has enough unskilled
workers to satisfy the demand of the agricultural good of the overall economy
and both regions always engage in agricultural production.
2.3 The Manufacturing sector
The Manufacturing sector produces di¤erentiated goods / varieties under stan-
dard Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition and incresing returns. The pro-
duction of each manufactured variety requires a xed input of one entrepreneur
and  units of unskilled labour services for each additional unit of output. Since
the entrepreneur has to advance wages to the unskilled workers by borrowing
the correspoding amount, marginal costs have to include interest payments;
therefore, the total costs of rm i (TCi;t, with i = 1:::N) are the following:
TCi;t = F + w(1 + ir;t)qi;t
where F is the remuneration of the entrepreneur, w is the wage of unskilled
workers, ir is the interest rate prevailing at time t in region r, and qi;t is the
output of a specic variety produced by rm i. Given consumerspreference for
variety and increasing returns, rm i produces a variety which is di¤erent from
those produced by the other rms, so that the number of varieties, n, is equal
to the number of rms, N , and to the number of entrepreneurs, n = N = E. By
denoting the share of entrepreneurs located in region 1 at time t by 0  t  1,
the number of varieties produced at time t in the rst and second region are
n1;t = tN and n2;t = (1  t)N , respectively.
2.4 The banking industry
The banking industry provides the working capital to rms under standard
Monti-Klein oligopolistic competition. Due to frictions in the payment sys-
tem, workers cannot buy goods before receiving wages while rms cannot pay
wages before selling goods, entrepeneurs have to borrow nancial resources from
banks in order to anticipate wage payments. The model does not allow for
inter-regional/international bank mobility and inter-regional/international cap-
ital mobility, so that banks cannot move from one region to another and cannot
lend to rms located in the other region. We assume a banking industry tech-
nology with a xed set up cost h, that, for example, consists of those costs
connected with data collection or data retrieving or, more generally, with those
frontor back o¢ cetechnologies involving some type of sunk cost (see Berger
2003); h is relatively small for banks that would lend to rms located in the
same region, but prohibitive for banks that would lend to rms located in the
other region or that would move in the other region.
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The demand for loans of the representative rm located in region r = 1; 2
corresponds to
mdr;t = wqi;t,
the payment for the amount of unskilled labour necessary to produce the quan-
tity qi;t; to be interpreted as the rms working capital requirement. The de-
mand for loans in one region is given by the demand for loans of the represen-
tative rm times the number of rms located in that region:
MDr;t = nr;tm
d
r;t = nr;twqi;t
The supply for loans in region r is
MSr;t = krm
s
r;t
where msr;t is the supply for loans of a representative bank and 0 < kr < K
denotes the number of banks located in region r. kr, which is exogenously given,
measures the degree of concentration/competition in the banking industry.
2.5 Transport costs
The products of both sectors are traded between the regions. Transportation
of the agricultural good is costless; whereas transportation of the manufactured
goods is characterised by iceberg trade costs: if one unit of good is shipped
between the regions only the fraction 1=T arrives at destination, where T 
1. Trade freeness is dened by  = T (1 ), where 0 <   1, with  = 1
representing no trade costs and ! 0 prohibitive trade costs.
3 Short-run General Equilibrium
Given the spatial allocation of entrepeneurs across the region, t, the short-run
general equilibrium in period t is characterized by equilibrium in the agricultural
good market, in the markets of the manufactured goods and in the loan market;
moreover, as a result of the Walrass law, simultaneous equilibrium in all these
markets also implies equilibrium in the regional labour markets.
Under perfect competition, costant return and no trade costs, the optimizing
behaviour of rms implies that the price of the agricultural good, pa, is the same
in both regions and equal to the wage of unskilled labour. By setting the the
agricultural price equal to 1, it becomes the numéraire in terms of which the
other prices are dened, we have then:
pa = w = 1
From the optimization problem of the representative consumer, total expen-
ditures on the agricultural product is (1  )YW;t, where YW;t = Y1;t + Y2;t is
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total income given by the sum of the income in region 1, Y1;t, and in region
2, Y2;t. The non-full-specialization condition requires that (1  )YW;t > L2 , so
that both regions produce the agricultural good.
Under Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition, increasing returns and a wage
of 1, the symmetric behaviour of rms determines for each variety the same mill
price given as a mark-up on marginal costs:
pr;t = (1 + ir;t)

   1 (2)
Note that the interest rate, ir;t, and the elasticity of substitution parameter, ,
have a similar e¤ect on the price: a decrease in , that is, an increase in the
degree of competition in the manufacturing sector, rises pr;t like an increase in
ir;t. By taking into account that the e¤ective price paid by consumers for a
variety produced in the other region is pr;tT , the regional manufacturing price
indices facing consumers, respectively, in region 1 and in region 2, are given by:
P1;t =
h
n1p
(1 ) + n2p(1 )T (1 )
i( 11  )
= 
1
1 
1;t N
1
1  p (3)
P2;t =
h
n1p
(1 )T (1 ) + n2p(1 )
i( 11  )
= 
1
1 
2;t N
1
1  p (4)
with 1;t  t + (1   t) and 2;t  t + (1   t). Since workers, entre-
preneurs, and bankers have the same tastes, income redistribution per se has
no direct impact on product demands; therefore total expenditure on manufac-
tured varieties is YW;t and the regional demands per variety, respectively, in
region 1 and in region 2, are:
d1;t =

Y1;tP
 1
1;t + Y2;tP
 1
2;t

p  =

stP
 1
1;t +  (1  st)P 12;t

YW;tp
 
(5)
d2;t =

Y1;tP
 1
1;t + Y2;tP
 1
2;t

p  =

stP
 1
1;t + (1  st)P 12;t

YW;tp
 
(6)
where st  Y1;tYW;t denotes the share of income of region 1 in total income. Short-
run general equilibrium in period t involves that the supply of a manufatured
variety must be equal to its demand, so that for each variety the following
equilibrium condition holds:
qr;t = dr;t (7)
From (2), the short-equilibrium operating prots per variety / entrepreneur
in region r can be expressed as:
r;t = pr;tqr;t   (1 + ir;t)qr;t = pr;tqr;t

(8)
7
According to (8) prot is proportional to the value of sales and it is not
directly a¤ected by the interest rate on loans. We now turn to the determination
of the equilibrium value of the latter variable.
Under Monti-Klein oligopolistic competition, the optimizing behaviour of
bankers allows to determine the regional interest rate ir;t. In order to simplify
the analysis as much as possible we do not consider the deposit market and
assume that banks are nanced by the monetary authority or, alternatively,
that only bankers own the appropriate technology to satisfy rms requirements
of working capital. The demand for loans in region r is negatively related to
the interest rate, ir;t:
MDr;t = nr;tr;t

N
   1
(1 + ir;t)
(9)
with
1;t  Y1;t
t + (1  t) +
Y2;t
t + 1  t
2;t  Y1;t
t + (1  t)+
Y2;t
t + 1  t
For convenience, from (9) we derive a relationship between the interest rate,
ir, and the demand for loans, MDr;t:
ir;t =
nr;t
N
r;t
(   1)
MDr;t
  1 (10)
Considering that in equilibrium the demand for loans has to be equal to the
supply, MSr;t =M
D
r;t, the objective function of bankers is
k;t =
"
nr;t
N
r;t
(   1)
MSr;t
  1
#
msr;t   h
where k;t denotes the prots of a single bank and
h
nr;t
r;t
N
( 1)
MSr;t
  1
i
msr;t cor-
responds to the revenues. The optimal amount of loans is:7
7 In general, the banks optimization problem corresponds to:
maxk;t =
h
1 + ir;t

MSr;t
i
msr;t   (1 + i)D   h
Prots are given by revenues (loans plus interests on loans) minus variable costs (deposits
plus interests on deposits) and xed costs. We assume that the amount of loans is equal to
deposits

msr;t = D

and that rate of interest on deposits is equal to zero (i = 0), so that the
above expression reduces to:
maxk;t = ir;t

MSr;t

msr;t   h
The optimization problem is solved by di¤erentiating with respect to the amount of loans.
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msr;t =
nr;tr;t (   1)
N
(kr;t   1)
(kr)
2 (11)
By replacing (11) into (10), we obtain the equilibrium solution for the interest
rate:
ir;t =
kr
kr   1   1 = ir (12)
The interest rate therefore only depends on the given number of local banks.
kr can be interpreted as a measure of the degree of competition in the banking
industry. Note that (12) is meaningless for kr = 1, when the oligopolistic
structure of the banking industry collapses to a monopoly. This result follows
from the specic shape of the demand for loans that, in turns, depends on the
assumptions of the FE model.
Regional incomes include wages, prots and bank revenues:
Y1;t =
L
2
+ tN1;t(   1) i1
1 + i1
+ tN1;t =
L
2
+ tN1;t

1 + i1
1 + i1

(13)
Y2;t =
L
2
+(1 t)N2;t( 1) i2
1 + i2
+(1 t)N2;t = L
2
+(1 t)N2;t

1 + i1
1 + i1

(14)
Using (2) to (8) and taking into account that from (12) the rate of interest
only depends on the given regional stock of bank capital, the regional short-run
equilibrium prots can be expressed as:
@k;t
@msr;t
=
@ir;t

MSr;t

@MSr;t
@MSr;t
@msr;t
msr;t + ir;t

MSr;t

= 0
ir;t

MSr;t

=
@ir;t

MSr;t

@MSr;t
msr;t
ir;t

MSr;t

MSr;t = M
S
r;t
@ir;t

MSr;t

@MSr;t
msr;t
MSr;t
msr;t
=
@ir;t

MSr;t

@MSr;t
MSr;t
ir;t

MSr;t

Note that
@MSr;t
@msr;t
= 1 and
@ir;t

MSr;t

@MSr;t
< 0.
In correspondence of the optimal amount of loans the elasticity of the interest rate with
respect to the demand for loans is equal to the number of banks ("i;m = kr) and the elasticity
of the demand for loans with respect to the interest rate is equal to the banks market share
"m;i =
msr;t
MSr;t

.
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1;t =

N

Y1;t
t + (1  t) +
Y2;t
t + 1  t

=

N
1;t
2;t =

N

Y1;t
t + (1  t)+
Y2;t
t + 1  t

=

N
2;t
Finally, using (13) and (14), we obtain:
1;t =
L

 (1 +2)  Z2(1  t)(1  2)

2N

212 + t(1  t)(1  2)Z1Z22    [tZ12 + (1  t)Z21]
	
2;t =
L

 (1 + 2)  Z1t(1  2)

2N

212 + t(1  t)(1  2)Z1Z22    [tZ12 + (1  t)Z21]
	
where Zr = 1+ir1+ir :
Given that the agricultural price is 1, the real income of an entrepreneur in
region r is:
!r;t = r;tP
 
r;t
The share t changes through time according to entrepreneurial migration
decisions, which are based on the comparison between regional incomes. We
now turn to the description of the migration law presenting the full dynamical
model.
4 Entrepreneurial migration and the full dynam-
ical system
Under the simplifying assumption of myopic behaviour (see Fujita et al. 1999,
Forslid and Ottaviano, 2003; and Baldwin et al., 2003) and more specically
of naïve expectations, the economic incentive of entrepreneurial migration is
summarised by the ratio of regional real incomes realised during period t:

(t) =
!1;t(t)
!r;t(t)
(15)
=
 (1 +2)  Z2(1  t)(1  2)
 (1 + 2)  Z1t(1  2)

2
1
 
1 

1 + i2
1 + i1

The ratio 
(t) is at the center of the dynamic law governing the shifts
between regions of the manufacturing activity:
M(t) = t + t(1  t) 
(t)  1
1 + t(
(t)  1) (16)
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where  denotes the migration speed.
Taking into account the obvious constraints on the entrepreneurial share
0  t  1, the full dynamical system is given by
t+1 = Z(t) =
8<: 0 if M(t) < 0M(t) if 0 M(t)  1
1 if M(t) > 1
(17)
A long-run equilibrium  satises the condition  = Z(). There are two
types of equilibria: a Core-Periphery equilibrium corresponds to all the manufac-
turing activity agglomerating in one region: CP (0) = 0 or CP (1) = 1; whereas
for an interior equilibrium it must be 
() = 1. However, in general, given the
shape of the function 
(), it is not possible to derive a closed form solution
for . Moreover, more than an interior equilibrium may exist. Therefore, in
what follows, except for the case of fully symmetric regions, we must rely on
simulations.
Stability requires that  1 < Z 0() < 1. Typically, the stability analysis
in discrete time is much more complicated that in continuous time (see Com-
mendatore et al., 2008), the former involving the possibility of a much larger
set of bifurcation scenarios. Thus, in order to keep the analogy with its con-
tinuous time counterpart, we assume that Z 0() >  1 and we explore the case
Z 0() <  1 in future work. Depending on the type of equilibrium consid-
ered, the condition Z0() < 1 translates into 
(0) < 1 or 
(1) > 1 for the
Core-Periperiphery equilibria CP (0) = 0 or CP (1) = 1, if the constraints are
not binding. Otherwise Z 0(0) = Z 0(1) = 0 when the constraints are binding.
Instead, an interior equilibrium is stable for 
0() < 0.
5 The case of fully symmetric regions
In the fully symmetric case the regions enjoy the same level of nancial develop-
ment and the banking capital is equally spread across space (i.e., k1 = k2 = K2 ,
which implies i1 = i2 = i). Eq. (15) becomes:

(t) =
 (1 +2)  Z(1  t)(1  2)
 (1 + 2)  Zt(1  2)

2
1
 
1 
with Z = 1+i1+i .
In this context, Figure 1 allows to describe the local stability properties of
interior and the Core-Periphery equilibria. As in the standard symmetric FE
model a symmetric interior equilibrium corresponding to an equal distribu-
tion of manufacturing activities between the regions  exists,  = 12 . This
equilibrium is stable for 

 
1
2

< 0, that is for:
 < B 
(   Z) (   1  )
( + Z) (   1 + )
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Figure 1: Symmetric case, i1 = i2
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where B represents the so-called breakpoint, above which trade is su¢ ciently
free so that agglomeration forces exceed dispersion forces; a small shock sets in
motion a cumulative process bringing about the progressive shift of all industrial
sector in only one region, with (   Z) (   1   ) > 0 representing the so-
called no black holecondition. In the terminology of the mathematical theory
of dynamical systems, B represents a (subcritical) pitchfork bifurcation point.
Instead, the Core-Periphery equilibria CP (0) = 0 and CP (1) = 1 are stable
as long as the following condition holds
() = 1 

 1   (1 + 
2)  Z(1  2)
2
> 0 (18)
Notice that the above condition applies simultaneously to both Core-Periphery
equilibria due to the symmetric properties of the map 
(t). It is possible to
show that there is a value of the trade freeness parameter, the so-called sustain
point, S , for which (S) = 0. S is the lowest value of trade freeness that
allows for a Core-periphery outcome. In the terminology of the mathematical
theory of dynamical systems, S represents a transcritical bifurcation pointor,
considering the hitting of the constraint a border collision bifurcation point.
Finally, for S <  < S , two other interior equilibria emerge which are
symmetric to each other, e and 1 e, in correspondence of which 
(e) = 
(1 e) = 1. These equilibria are both unstable and separate the basins of attraction
of the symmetric and Core-Periphery equilibria; where a basin of attraction of
an equilibrium represents the set of initial values of the entrepreneurial share,
0, that converges to that equilibrium. The larger is the set the more likely is
that the corresponding equilibrium becomes the nal state of the system.
With the help of Figure 1, we also explore the consequences of a reduction in
the degree of competition within the banking sector increasing by same amount
the rate of interest of the regions (i1 = i2 = i > 0). As shown in gure
1 by the shift from the black to the blue line this implies that the symmetric
equilibrium becomes unstable for a lower level of trade freeness, while the Core-
Periphery equilibria become stable at a lower level of , so both the break point
and the sustain point move to the left with respect to their previous values (from
bkB to 
bl
B and from 
bk
S to 
bl
S ).
Thus, the introduction of a banking sector within a FE model favours ag-
glomeration over dispersion forces. This can be explained considering that a
positive interest has two e¤ects: i) on production costs since it increases the
wedge between the marginal cost of unskilled labour and the price of the manu-
factured varieties; however, due to symmetry this has no bearings on the distrib-
ution of economic activities between the regions; ii) on the overall income, since
it increases bank revenues, without a¤ecting the other income components; and
therefore making more relevant the so-called home market e¤ect given that
bankers are not mobile. Indeed, for the symmetric case, it can be shown that
Y1;t + Y2;t = YW =
L(1 + i)
   + (1  )i
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and then @YW@i =
( 1)L
[ +(1 )i]2 > 0.
A change in the degree of competition in the manufacturing sector has a
similar e¤ect. A decrease in the elasticity of substitution ( < 0) / an in-
crease in the love of variety determines an increase in the mark-up over the
marginal cost of labour. Also in this case, the impact of the home market e¤ect
(and therefore the weight of agglomeration with respect to dispersion forces)
is stronger. Overall, a lower degree of competition, both in the manufacturing
sector and in the banking sector, enhances agglomeration forces, making more
likely Core-periphery outcomes.
6 Unequal nancial development
In the context of our model, the idea of uneven nancial development is cap-
tured by the assumption of a di¤erent distribution of capital stocks between
the regions. From (12), this implies di¤erent regional interest rates, i1 6= i2.
Notwithstanding this is a simple modication, the assumption of asymmetric
regions does not allow for closed form solutions. Therefore, as mentioned above,
we have to resort to simulations.
Figures 2 and 3 show how the structure of the long-term equilibria is notably
modied when we consider regions characterised by di¤erent levels of nancial
development.
Figures 2 presents the case when the interest rate of the region 1 is smaller
than the interest rate of region 2, i1 < i2. The equilibrium locus is now split
into two pieces: the rst lying above and the second below the 0.5 horizontal
line. Considering the piece above, for 0 <  < S(1), only three equilibria exist,
the interior asymmetric equibrium just above the 0.5 horizontal line is stable,
whereas the two Core-Periphery equilibria are unstable. As  crosses S(1),
the Core-Periphery equilibrium CP (1) = 1 gains stability. Within the interval
S(1) <  < B , another interior equilibium is present, which is unstable, with
S(1) representing a sustain point for 
CP (1) and in terms of the language
of dynamical systems theory, a transcriticalbifurcation point. The latter has
emerged togheter with the stable equilibrium, after a so-called fold bifurcation,
as  crossed from right to left B . As before, the unstable equilibrium sepa-
rates the basins of attraction of the stable asymmetric interior equilibrium and
of the Core-Periphery equilibrium CP (1) = 1. At  = S(0), representing a
sustain point for the Core-Periphery equilibrium CP (0) and a transcritical
bifurcation point as well  the second piece of the equilibrium locus enters in
the relevant interval [0; 1] on which it is lying another unstable interior asym-
metric equilibrium. For S(0) <  < B , ve equilibria exist with again the two
unstable asymmetric equilibria separating the basins of attraction of the stable
asymmetric equilibrium and of the two Core-Periphery equilibria. Finally, for
 > B only the piece of the equilibrium locus below 0.5 exists. The unstable
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Figure 2: Asymmetric case, i1 < i2
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Figure 3: Asymmetric case, i1 > i2
asymmetric equilibria separates now the basins of attraction of the two Core-
Periphery equilibria, with the basin of CP (1) notably larger that the one of
CP (0).
In summary, when i1 < i2, the interior stable equilibrium becomes asymmet-
ric with a larger share of rms located in region 1 ( > 12 ), but also unstable
for a lower level of the trade freness; at the same time, the Core-Periphery equi-
librium where all rms are located in region 1 (CP (1)) becomes stable for a
lower level of trade freness with respect to both the symmetric case and the
Core-Periphery equilibrium where all rms are located in region 2 ( = 0).
Thus, rms tend to move in the region where the degree of concentration in the
banking industry and the interest rate are lower; and obviously, this e¤ect is
the greater the larger is the di¤erence between interest rates (as shown in gure
2 after shifting the black line into the blue line). The same reasoning applies
for the opposite situation according to which region 2 has the most advanced
nancial sector (i1 > i2, see Figure 3) .
Comparing Figures 1 and 2 it is also possible to describe a process of loca-
tional hysteresis. In the symmetric case, if the trade freness parameter ranges
between the sustain point and the break point and the symmetric equilibrium
is stable, a temporary shock determining a reduction of the interest rate in re-
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gion 1 could induce rms to move from region 2 to region 1, and could drive
the economy away from that equilibrium, now disappeared, towards the Core-
Periphery equilibrium, again stable, where all rms are located in region 1; in
this context, the removal of the shock would not bring back the economy to
the previous equilibrium. The process of locational hysteresis has relevant im-
plications for the policy analysis because regions implementing earlier reforms,
which increases the degree of competition in the banking industry and lowers
the interest rate, get a rst mover advantage; in fact, regions adopting later the
same reform could not arrest or reverse the migration of rms towards the other
region.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we provided a rst contribution lling a gap in the NEG litera-
ture by exploring the relationship between the spatial distribution of industrial
economic and the level of nancial development.
To accomplish thisobjective, we introduced in a standard fooloose entrepre-
neur (FE) model an oligopolistic banking sector.
Our results can be summarized as follows.
When regions are characterised by the same degree of nancial development,
a reduction in the degree of competition in the banking sector, determining an
equal increase in the rate of interest in the regions, implies that the symmetric
equilibrium becomes unstable for a lower level of trade freeness, while, at the
same time, the Core-Periphery equilibria become stable, so that the introduction
of a banking sector within a FE model favours agglomeration forces through an
income e¤ect.
When the degree of nancial development is di¤erent for the two regions,
these results are reinforced: the stable interior equilibrium becomes asymmetric
with a larger share of entrepreneur located in the region where the competition
degree of the banking sector is higher; at the same time, the Core-Periphery
equilibrium where all rms are located in the region with the lower interest rate
becomes stable at a lower level of trade freeness and, compared with the Core-
Periphery equilibrium where all rms are located in the region with the higher
interest rate, becomes the most likely outcome. Basically, a divergence in the
level of nancial development between the regions could promote a migration
process where manufacturing rms would tend to move towards the region with
a more competitive banking sector and with a lower interest rate; and, obviously,
this e¤ect is the higher the larger is the di¤erence between the interest rates.
Finally, as in the standard FE model, the analysis also allows to display a
process of locational hysteresis. If the economy is characterized by an interior
stable and symmetric equilibrium, a temporary shock determining a reduction
of the interest rate in one region could induce rms to move towards the other
region favouring agglomeration, the removal of the shock could not reverse this
result. Locational hysteresis has relevant implications for policy analysis because
regions implementing earlier reforms, which reduce the concentretion degree in
17
the banking industry and the interest rate, get a rst mover advantage; in fact,
regions adopting later the same reform could not arrest or reverse the migration
of rms towards the other region.
Within the logical framework of the NEG, this paper represents a rst step of
a research project aiming to explore the impact of the degree of regional nancial
development on the spatial distribution of economic activity. Next steps would
have to be targeted to remove some of our simplifying assumption: on the one
hand, we could allow for inter-regional/international bank mobility and/or for
inter-regional/international nancial capital ows; on the other hand, we could
allow for a propensity to save greater than zero and so we could introduce a
market for deposits. Morerover, within an analitical framework di¤erent from
the FE model, we could allow banks to provide loans also to nance investment
in xed capital.
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